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Abstract 
 
There is a kernel of truth in the claim that Western philosophy and practice of 
education is individualistic; theory in Euro-America tends to prize properties that are 
internal to a human being, such as her autonomy, rationality, knowledge, pleasure, 
desires, self-esteem and self-realization, and education there tends to adopt 
techniques focused on the individual placed at some distance from others. What is 
striking about other philosophical-educational traditions in the East and the South is 
that they are typically much more communitarian. I argue that since geographical 
terms such as ‘Western’, ‘African’ and the like are best construed as picking out 
properties that are salient in a region, it is fair to conclude that the Western is 
individualist and that the African is communitarian. What this means is that, if I am 
correct about a noticeable contrast between philosophies of education typical in the 
West and in sub-Saharan Africa, and if there are, upon reflection, attractive facets of 
communitarianism, then those in the West and in societies influenced by it should in 
some real sense become less Western, in order to take them on. 
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‘It is impossible to make a general statement that covers every 
exception, and yet conversation so often consists of each person 
pointing out the obvious exceptions to the other person’s statements.’  
––Hugh Prather (Notes to Myself) 
 
Introduction: Philosophy of Philosophy of Education 
Western philosophies of education are individualist, whereas sub-Saharan African 
ones are communitarian.  
I believe that statement is true, and that it can be sensibly asserted without 
committing any of the sins routinely lumped under the heading of ‘essentializing’, that 
is, without indicating that all and only theories of education from Euro-America are 
individualist and that all and only those from below the Sahara are communitarian, 
and without implying that views from these locales necessarily have these respective 
characteristics.1 In this article, I aim to provide a general account of how to plausibly 
construe geographical labels such as ‘Western’ and ‘African’, and to bring out what it 
entails for the way to understand different philosophies of education. 
Although I reject an essentialist use of geographical labels, that does not 
mean that I advance a constructivist one according to which their meaning is 
determined merely by the properties that those in a group mentally associate with 
them. Contra the constructivist, I believe that a geographical label such as ‘Western’ 
has an objective content about which people can be mistaken, while contra the 
essentialist, I maintain that this content is not exclusive to, exhaustive of or fixed in 
                                            
1 And, furthermore, without suggesting that people in these locations are morally 
obligated to hold views with such features. 
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the relevant locale. In terms familiar to those with expertise in the philosophy of 
language, I maintain that the referent of geographical labels is determined neither by 
a mere cluster of descriptions nor by rigid designation. 
Appealing to my account of what terms such as ‘Western’ plausibly mean, I 
ultimately suggest that because of what I see as individualist blind spots in the 
Western tradition, those who adhere to Western views probably have some good 
reason to hold ones that are more communitarian. Although the words ‘Western’ and 
the like can be used without essentializing, it is likely the case that what is picked out 
by that term is too narrow for developing an attractive philosophy of education. If so, 
and the Western tradition has something to learn from African or more broadly 
communitarian perspectives, then, as I explain, the West should become less 
Western and should change what ‘Western’ means. 
How to Construe Geographical Labels 
My view about what geographical labels mean is this: they refer to features that are 
salient in a locale, at least over a substantial amount of time. They pick out properties 
that have for a long while been recurrent in a place in a way they have tended not to 
be elsewhere. They denote fairly long-standing characteristics in a region that 
differentiate it from many other regions.  
 Such a view is not constructivist, for it implies that there is a mind-independent 
fact of the matter about the frequency with which certain properties are present in 
places, about which one or one’s group could be mistaken. Such a view is also not 
essentialist, for it does not imply that the relevant properties are to be found only in a 
certain location, throughout that location or invariably in it. 
 Consider some examples. Marsupials are Australian. That is true, I submit, 
even though one will find a number of marsupials in South and Central America, one 
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will not find marsupials in downtown Sydney, and the day could come when there are 
no marsupials in Australia. Hence, a natural reading of the statement is not 
essentialist. In addition, it is not constructivist, for what makes it the case that 
marsupials are Australian is not merely that people believe it to be; if a group 
asserted that marsupials were not Australian but rather African, it would be incorrect. 
Instead, the claim that marsupials are Australian appears true in virtue of the 
objective fact that marsupials have for a long while been frequent in Australia in a 
way they have tended not to be elsewhere. Basically, they stand out there.  
 Here is another one: baseball is American. Again, I submit this claim is true, 
but not true ‘essentially’. After all, the Cubans and Japanese are well known for 
playing baseball; it is course true that not all Americans play it or even appreciate it; 
and there is nothing preventing Americans from giving up this sport entirely. And, 
again, the fact that baseball is American is not ‘constructed’, for if a sociologist of 
sport failed to mention baseball when aiming to provide a general account of sport in 
the States, she would be epistemically guilty of having made a glaring omission. 
Baseball is American insofar as it is salient there.  
 Now let me turn to terms that are central to the topic of this article. Consider 
the fact that the combination of markets, science and constitutionalism is Western. 
That is true even though one will find it in places beyond Europe and America, such 
as South Africa and Australia, and even though one will not find it deep in the 
Amazon jungle among, say, the Yanomami people.  
Similarly, it is African to hold a belief in the need to respect ancestors, wise 
progenitors of a clan who have survived the death of their bodies and now live in an 
invisible form on earth. That is true despite the facts that far from all sub-Saharans 
hold this belief and that other traditions, particularly in the East, also include 
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reverence for ancestors. What makes the label ‘African’ or ‘sub-Saharan’ apt is that a 
belief in ancestors is at the core of the moral and cosmological worldviews of a great 
many indigenous peoples below the Sahara. 
 In short, talk of things ‘Western’ and ‘African’ picks out features that are salient 
in these respective parts of the world,2 which, contra some philosophers of 
education, does not mean that calling something ‘African’ implies that it is utterly 
unique to that part of the world (e.g., Parker 2003; Horsthemke and Enslin 2005). I 
believe that this what most people mean when they use such terms, in light of the 
several examples above. However, if I am incorrect about that, then note that it would 
be quite useful if people were to use them this way. I agree that the sins of 
essentialism are sins, even if those who point them out tend to be too quick to cast 
stones. And if one were to be constructivist about these terms, then people would 
routinely speak past one another when they associate different properties with the 
same term (a familiar problem with the descriptivist or cluster theory of reference). In 
sum, I submit that my account of geographical labels accurately describes the way 
people use them or at least the way they should in order to facilitate comparison and 
debate. 
Western and African Philosophy of Education Compared 
If I am correct about how to use geographical labels, then, in order to characterize 
Western philosophy of education in comparison to African, I need to recount 
                                            
2 I here acknowledge political sensitivities about the use of the term ‘African’ and 
cognate words. Some have argued that it is immoral or otherwise inappropriate to 
use such terms, given that they are apparently colonial conceptual impositions and 
not the way indigenous black peoples initially referred to themselves (e.g., Ramose 
2004, pp. 145–146). 
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properties that are salient in these two traditions. Upon doing so, I conclude in this 
section that it is fair to deem the former individualist and the latter communitarian.  
 For a long while in the Western part of the world, i.e., in Europe, the UK and 
North America, the practices and philosophies of education have been recurrently 
focused on individual persons. Consider this first when it comes to the final ends 
sought out or prescribed. Practitioners and theorists have tended to prize properties 
that are internal to a human being, making no essential reference to anyone but her. I 
have in mind properties such as her autonomy, rationality, intellectual virtues, self-
development, self-esteem, pleasure, desires and employability. It is extraordinarily 
common to find Western normative theorists maintaining that the ultimate aim of 
education should be to enable the young to judge their traditions, to think critically, to 
freely pursue a conception of the good, to realize themselves and so on. Individual 
agency has been the name of the game. 
In addition, with respect to higher education, a notable element of Western 
approaches has been to seek out knowledge for its own sake. For instance, Aristotle 
famously rates knowledge of the cosmos as the highest to be obtained despite being 
‘useless’ and not among ‘human goods’, and Edmund Husserl (1935) characterizes 
the entire European intellectual tradition in terms of a propensity to adopt what he 
calls ‘a purely “theoretical” attitude’ that is ‘thoroughly unpractical’3. 
 There have been exceptions, of course. To name just two, one will find some 
American theorists arguing that public education ought to instil the virtues essential 
for a democracy to flourish (Macedo 1990) or those needed for cosmopolitan 
                                            
3 Discussed by Nisbett (2003) in contrast to characteristically East Asian approaches 
to knowledge. 
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citizenship (Nussbaum 2010).4 Here, there is an essential reference to others 
besides the individual student; she is supposed to acquire the knowledge and skills 
needed to promote and participate in just power relations.  
However, for one, it is implausible to think that these should be the sole or 
even primary final ends of education; they are best construed as supplementing other 
final ends. For another, as should become clear below, these relational elements are 
thin compared to other, non-Western traditions such as the African, where values of 
sociality are much richer and deemed essential to exhibit in many spheres of one’s 
life, not just the political. For a third, these relational positions are rare in comparison 
to the intrinsic ones, which point also applies to the care-oriented thought about 
education of Nel Noddings (1984, 1992). 
Turning now to the characteristic means by which final ends have been 
pursued in the West, consider that a large majority of it: (a) has taken place in a 
dedicated school building and (b) been run by professional instructors in light of (c) a 
preset, vetted curriculum that (d) has focused on written texts. In addition, the 
instruction (e) has sought to impart mainly propositional knowledge that categorizes 
things and happenings and seeks underlying principles by which to account for them 
(f) established through argumentation, with students (g) oriented toward obtaining a 
degree or certificate so as to compete on a labour market and (h) being assessed on 
how well they each do on tests.5 
                                            
4 And for a recent collection of work that forms an alternative to analytic-liberal 
approaches to the philosophy of education, see Carr (2005).  
5 I borrow some of this schema from Metz (2012), but have enriched it here.  
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Most of these elements are plausibly characterized as ‘individualist’ in some 
way, at least in comparison to education models salient in other parts of the world or 
in different eras. The (a) condition, about where the education takes place, is itself 
noteworthy for being separated from the broader community and the worlds of work, 
home and civil society. In addition, consider how the (b) and (c) elements keep 
students apart from each other and from the instructor; teachers are typically in 
control of a classroom such that most of the communication is unidirectional, 
coming ‘downward’ from a single source, and what they convey is unchanging in 
response to student particularity. As for (d), recall Marshall McLuhan’s insightful 
reflections on the written word, and what new, isolating behaviours and interiorized 
mindsets came in the wake of reading books. The content of the books and other 
instruction (e) is typically focused not on developing interpersonal skills or 
understanding facets of the world in relational or holistic terms; it instead 
concentrates on classifying objects and events held to be able to known in isolation 
from other conditions (on which see Nisbett 2003). The technique by which such 
information is conveyed or supported is often a matter of argumentation (f), i.e., 
competition between competing hypotheses in which one seeks to win by virtue of 
marshalling the strongest evidence. Students are typically motivated by self-
regarding considerations such as doing well on a competitive labour market, viz., 
obtaining a job and earning money (g). Finally, assessment is normally done so that 
each student is evaluated on her own (h).  
Of course, there are exceptions to the above. However, I submit that it is the 
dominant approach to pedagogy in high schools and universities in Western 
countries and other societies heavily influenced by them. Since the above ends and 
means are salient in the West, i.e., have been recurrent there for a long while in a 
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way they have not been elsewhere, at least not to the same degree, I dub them 
‘Western’, in accordance with the previous account of how to use geographical 
labels.  
I now consider which educational ends and means may be plausibly labelled 
‘African’ or, more specifically, ‘sub-Saharan’, by virtue of being salient below the 
Sahara desert. With respect to final ends, it is well known that pre-colonial, and more 
generally indigenous, African education has mainly sought to enable students to 
undertake labour of a sort that would support their society, to impart the customs of 
the community to students, and to develop their moral excellence, understood as 
centred on a disposition to relate communally with others (Adeyinka and Ndwapi 
2002; Adeyemi and Adeyinka 2003). Even contemporary discussions among sub-
Saharan philosophers and thinkers about higher education have similarly focused 
substantially on the final ends of promoting development for the society as a whole, 
supporting local culture, and promoting moral personhood, or so I have discovered 
upon making a critical survey of more than 65 post-war texts in African higher 
education theory (Metz 2009a)6.  
The relational or social dimensions of these goals are palpable, in comparison 
to those of the Western tradition. The interests or capacities of a given individual 
student considered in herself count for relatively little in the frameworks typical of 
sub-Saharan Africa; she is instead in the first instance directed outward, towards the 
interests of others or the flourishing of the group. The point of education is to enable 
her to take up work that would be of use to her society, to learn and adapt to its 
                                            
6 I note that a concern to rectify injustice has also figured prominently (e.g., Nkomo 
2000; Ramose 2004), but I set it aside as a contingent and ‘non-ideal’ end, i.e., one 
that arises only in the context of serious wrongdoing at the societal level.  
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folkways, and to become the sort of person who treats others in a morally sound 
manner.  
Note that I have been unable to find a single African thinker who extols the 
desirability of knowledge for its own sake. When this approach to intellectual 
engagement is discussed by sub-Saharans, they are invariably dismissive of it as 
inappropriate for an African context (for citations and discussion, see Metz 2009b). In 
addition, whereas debate rages among Western theorists about whether moral 
education is permissible as a final end of at least higher education (see, e.g., the 
contributions to Kiss and Euben 2010), African ones by and large take it for granted 
as an appropriate goal. 
With respect to means, sub-Saharans have also been less individualistic, and 
one might say extremely so when it comes to traditional practices among rural, small-
scale societies. Returning to the schema that I used above, education (a*) was often 
undertaken in the community and ‘on the job’ and (b*) imparted by those with a 
particular ‘know-how’ or ‘knowledge that’ but no special training in pedagogical 
techniques in light of (c*) a given student’s gender and talents without review by 
some group of parents or officials and (d*) transmitted orally. In addition, the 
instruction (e*) sought to impart practical skills and parochial worldviews (f*) through 
rote memorization, imitation and group discussion, with students (g*) aiming to 
contribute to the well-being of their extended families and society more generally and 
(h*) not being formally assessed as individuals through tests scheduled at particular 
times, but rather by demonstrating an eventual acquisition of the skill or exhibiting an 
understanding in the course of collective dialogue. 
Of course, contemporary education in urban environments below the Sahara 
hardly conforms to this ‘ideal-type’ (in the words of Weber) that was common before 
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the influence of European settlers. However, one continues to find African education 
theorists advocating the adoption of means reminiscent of elements of this traditional 
orientation. For instance, one education theorist from South Africa contends that 
mathematics and science should include the learner’s context and be ‘embedded in 
the cultural practices of the African majority’, e.g., by reflecting systematically on the 
fractal patterns of African traditional settlements (Seepe 2000, pp. 131–133), while 
another similarly advocates local and participatory, or ‘community-based’, research 
(Nkomo 2000, p. 53). For another example, a philosopher from Nigeria has argued in 
a systematic way for the view that certain types of ‘indoctrination’, and other forms of 
teaching that do not necessarily encourage student questioning, are appropriate as 
ways to impart virtue (Ikuenobe 2006). Finally, Kwasi Wiredu, probably the most 
influential African philosopher alive, has contended that ‘if education is an 
apprenticeship in the living of life in the community, then dialogue would naturally be 
one of its watchwords’ (2004, p. 21), and I have similarly argued that an interest in 
realizing communal relationships, central to characteristic African understandings of 
virtue and justice, recommends the creation of dialogical ‘communities of educational 
practice’ and the adoption of work-based learning (Metz 2012). 
My own view is that because of the salience of individualist ends and means in 
educational thought and practice in the West over many lifetimes, it is fair to think of 
‘Western’ education as individualist, with similar remarks entailing that ‘African’ 
education counts as communitarian. To some readers, these labels will still seem 
overly restrictive and too exhaustive, objectionably implying that, e.g., all and only 
educational elements in the West are individualist, which is of course not the case. 
Although the previous section makes clear, I believe, why it would be uncharitable to 
read the geographical labels in that way, perhaps such readers will at least accept 
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that the Western is more individualist than the African, and, conversely, that the latter 
is more communitarian than the former. That will be enough to make my concluding 
point in the final section, that those in the West might have good reason to become 
less Western. 
How to Question Individualism 
I lack the space here to give adherents to characteristically Western positions about 
education a compelling rationale to change their mind. Instead, my aim is to indicate 
some prima facie reasons to doubt the attractiveness of the extent of individualism to 
be found in Euro-American thought and practice with respect to education, and to 
point out what it would mean for Westerners to change in a more communitarian 
direction. 
 Unfortunately, much of so-called ‘communitarian’ criticism of liberalism and 
relatedly individualist trends in English-speaking philosophy of education and related 
theorization has not cut deeply. Too often, critics point out things to the effect that 
individuals cannot flourish on their own or that various institutions require certain 
kinds of social interaction in order to sustain themselves. However, these are 
sociological banalities, points that no one could reasonably question and that do not 
tell against individualism, construed in the first instance as an account of what to 
value as a final end. I am simply not aware of any influential Western thinker who has 
claimed that it is possible for, say, a child to grow up into a normal adult without 
socialization or an adult to make substantial achievements as a Robinson Crusoe on 
a deserted island. Rebutting such empirical claims is, I submit, a waste of time that 
fails to move the debate forward; for even the most rabid egoist, individualist par 
excellence, will readily admit that in order for his self-interest to be maximized, he 
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needs to rely on various kinds of positive sociality from family, friends, colleagues, 
neighbours. Hobbes hardly argued that one should live alone. 
 Where communitarian criticism has some bite is when it poses normative 
questions, about what makes a life worth living, how to treat others morally, or what 
public institutions ought to be striving to achieve, and when it posits essentially 
relational answers to them. Consider, for example, the idea that sometimes it is 
appropriate for people to make choices because ‘this is who we are’. Note that one 
probably thinks at some level that loving and friendly relationships are to be valued 
for their own sake. Ponder the suggestion that a genuine psychopath, one utterly 
unable to empathize, to sympathize and to act for the sake of others, has a lower 
moral status than someone with these capacities. Think about the view that, when it 
comes to distributing goods in one’s private capacity, one has basic moral reason to 
favour those for whom one cares and with whom one identifies. Reflect on the 
suggestion that one can have a duty to aid those related to one, but not because one 
has voluntarily assumed an obligation to do so by having promised or the like. Notice 
the prima facie attractiveness of the idea that one function of a public school should 
be to overcome divisions of race, class and the like and to foster a sense of 
togetherness, and that a government more generally ought to promote national 
cohesion in certain ways. Contemplate the notion that a public hospital should fund 
cosmetic surgery as necessary to facilitate romantic and other desirable social 
interaction. Pause over the perspective that one proper function of a criminal justice 
system should be to repair broken relationships between the offender and his direct 
and indirect victims. Finally, see that not to be dismissed is the idea that the state 
ought to support the institution of marriage (even if it should broaden its application in 
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many jurisdictions) as well as to help fund counselling for couples and classes for 
parents.7 
 If one is sympathetic towards these kinds of approaches, then one will likely 
think that they should inform education and that the Western tradition needs 
correction to some degree. If one were to construct a philosophy of education that 
posited relational final ends, as well as means that gave independent weight to 
relational considerations, then one would in effect be developing a non-Western, or 
at least less Western, viewpoint. Given the current meaning of the word ‘Western’ 
and cognate terms, as referring to long-standing individualist thought and practice in 
Euro-America, a more communitarian approach on the part of those living there 
would mean becoming not so Western.  
 However, recall my point that what counts as ‘Western’, or what more 
generally falls under the heading of geographical labels, is not fixed. If there occurred 
a systematic shift among those living in the West towards communitarian worldviews 
and ways of life, then what the term ‘Western’ refers to would change. Over time, 
given enough movement away from individualism in Euro-American contexts, then 
the Western would become communitarian. To return to the philosophy of language, 
although I do not believe that geographical labels are identical in function to 
indexicals such as ‘you’ and ‘this’8, they are similar in that their linguistic content 
varies, depending on the context in which they are used.  
                                            
7 For discussion and defence of a number of these ideas, see Metz (2010) and Metz 
and Gaie (2010). 
8 Whereas indexicals plausibly rigidly designate, referring to the essence of a being 
in all possible worlds (as per Kaplan 1989), I doubt that geographical labels do and 
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 As someone sympathetic towards the communitarian normative perspectives 
adumbrated above, I conclude that the West should become less Western, or, in 
other words, that it ought to change what the meaning of ‘Western’ is. However, as 
someone who also believes that those in the African tradition often miss out on some 
kernels of truth in Euro-American viewpoints, particularly with regard to the value of 
knowledge for its own sake (Metz 2009a, 2013), I am also partial to the idea that 
those in Africa should become less African. My hope is that this article has made the 
coherence, if not attractiveness, of such claims apparent to the reader.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                        
believe they instead pick out a collection of properties or, perhaps, a subject of such 
a collection. 
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